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THIS paper is suggested by a recent article. "Why I am an
Unbeliever."^ The writer avows a disbelief in God, Immor-
tality, the Divine inspiration of the Scriptures. Unfortunately while
intimate, frank, and even engaging in his naivete he fails to specify
exactly what he means by disbelief. If his disb-elief is no more than
a statement of our ignorance of any material physical proof of these
truths probably most of the thinking world including many common-
ly known as believers would agree with him. Eor of course there is
no material physical proof to establish these truths. It might well
be asked what competent physical proof would be possible. Eor my
own part I cannot conceive the sort of physical proof that would
suffice, nor can I conceive any capacity in myself to weigh such proof
were it produced. The article s-eems to proceed on the assumption
that the invisible is non existent reminding one of the half educated
Yokel who declared he would believe nothing that he could not see,
to whom his Quaker friend made gentle retort, "Hast ever seen thine
own brains?" Perhaps this is too flippantly smart for a serious dis-
cussion, how^ever. Bacon's remark seems more fitting for so grave
a theme: "]\Iy first admonition (which was also my praver) is that
men confine the sense within the limits of duty in respect of things
divine ; for the sense is like the sun which reveals the face of earth
but seals and shuts up the face of heaven. "-
The true philosophical attitude on the subject is well stated by
Charles Bradlaugh, the English statesman : "The Atheist does not
say there is no God but says I do not know what you mean by God.
* "^ * I do not deny God because I cannot deny that which I have
no conception of." This simply emphasizes the intellectual incapacity
^In The FonifJi. December, 1926.
-Preface to Novum Orga>iitiii.
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of the human mind to conceive that dread all powerful being who
governs the Universe. It does not declare that on the spiritual side
Ihere is no God nor any knowledge or evidence of his existence.
The difficulty of the unbeliever lies in his point of view. Assum-
ingi that these truths are of a material physical sort he demands
material physical evidence of them, although as just remarked, it
would be impossible for him to specify exactly what he means by
such evidence. Spiritual truths call for spiritual proof, they are
only spiritually discerned. This means that we must look for our
proofs in an entirely different direction. In our own souls we must
find what we can never discover in the external world of matter.
There are a great many such truths both intellectual and spiritual
whose only voucher is ourselves.
They may be called intellectual and spiritual compulsions that
are impress-ed on us entirely independent of our own volition. We
must accept them, to disbelieve them is impossible, such are the
axioms, nothing comes from nothing (nihil ex nihilo fit), a straight
line is the shortest distance between two points, twice two is four,
and the like. Spiritual compulsions like intellectual compulsions
prove themselves, they stand in no need of demonstration but are
examples of the immediate apprehension of truth. Indeed it is hard
to see how anything could ever get proved if there were no such self-
proving propositions which afford a basis for the proof of others less
self-evident. The process of proof must always start with some
admitted truth. A uni\ersal skeptic could never prove anything.
I cannot prove that twice two makes four, or that nothing comes
from nothing, any more than I can prove that the idea of God com-
forts and satisfies my soul. If anyone denies these truths, there is
nothing to be said, there is no possibility of pro\ing them, they are
examples of the immediate apprehension of truth.
Apart from these spiritual compulsions there are certain intel-
lectual compulsions concerning God which deserve consideration, for
God holds two aspects for the Ego, on the side of emotion, feeling,
the spiritual side, there is the felt need of his care and omniscient
supervision of our life. The idea of God answers the spiritual crav-
ing after something above and beyond ourselves to whom to look for
comfort, \\c\\), in our perplexities and troubles, in fine to give us a
reason for our lif-e here, a life to the thoughtful full of mystery,
pregnant with problems that are only solvable in God. The most
])ronounced Atheist would hardly deny the existence of this craving.
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this compulsion of the soul, although he might not be able to find
any external physical evidence of Clod's existence. It is not a ques-
tion of external existence but of internal truth. To deny this crav-
ing is to deny the man's own .existence, for these compulsions are the
man himself, they are he, he is they. Whether externally true or
not he is compelled to think twice two make four. While he cannot
l)rove either of them hv any external evidence, they are true for him
and that is all we know or can know.
In a like manner were I asked to prove the inspiration of the
Scriptures what more can be said than that they ins]Mre me?" What
other proof in the nature of things could be adduced? I cannot
otherwise pro\e my delight in a melody of Mozart or justify my en-
joyment of a poem of Keats or Tenn^•son : they are (|uite inex]ilicable
on any external physical basis of proof. Prove that Mozart never
existed or that Keats was a mere invention of his i)ublisher: it does
not touch my emotions which for me are their truth. What other
proof of their truth could the most radical unbclic\er demand? He
might deny that they ]:)roduced these emotions in himself but that
would not aft'ect their truth as regards myself, that he got nothing
from them is his loss, it does not affect me or their truth f<^r me.
The moment the unbeliever is i^nned down to concrete practical de-
tails such as these the absurdity of his contention becomes appar-
ent : for all these carry their credentials within themselves, they re-
quire nothing n]ore. The coming of an angel or some other super-
natural voucher would add nothing to their spiritual truth, nor can
I imagine what sort of credentials could be expected from such
messengers, credentials that would certify their authenticity, nor
what criterion I possess for judging those credentials.
The intellectual compulsion is distinct from this. It ref|uires us
by the laws of our thinking to think a God. not an elxclusivel\- hu-
man conception,—that conception belongs to our spiritual com-
jjulsion which demands for our emotions an anthropomorphic con-
ception—but as some mighty incomprehensible power, not in this as-
]iect necessarily human, what is called philosophically, the Absolute,
the Whole, of which men and all things are but ])arts bound together,
unitefl in it in some mysterious way of which we can form no intelli-
gent conception. ]\lan is thus com])elled to think all things including
himself as an organized whole governed by law informed with in-
telligence. It is impossible to think them as coming spontaneously
out of nothiu"". ScMiiething must ha\e caused them and must hold
Cl58 THE OPKX COURT
them together and prescribe rules for their action. This instinct of
unity as it might be called is universal in some shape with all men,
civilized or savage. It is a thought of the Ages, this thought of some
over-ruling power that holds all men under its rule and care. It is
both a spiritual and an intellectual compulsion that takes many forms,
the details varying with the spiritual and intellectual capacitv of
the thinker. The endeavor to think it has given us gods without
number, Haal, Ashtaroth. ( )siris, Jupiter, all expressions, different
forms, of the underlying conij^julsion. The needs of the savage and
the civilized, the ignorant and the educated vary spiritually and in-
tellectually in details, but not in fundamentals. The s]:)iritual truths
that satisfy the Esquimaux or the African may not be in details the
truth that a Philip Brooks or a Newman crave, but in essentials they
are the same. The intellectual compulsions that rule the mind of an
Einstein or a Xewton probably would not be understood by a school
boy, yet there lies latent in the mind of all three the compulsions
that would compel all to think alike when they developed the capacity
to think at all and to find satisfaction in ])reciselv the same mathe-
matical truths These truths are entirely independent of their per-
sonal individual will, they are imposed upon that will by the over-
ruling power that governs them and all things ; they are the com-
mon property of all thinking beings. 01)serve>, however, that this
universality gives them no additional validity ; that is derived solely
from the individual personal compulsion of the mind itself, as some-
thing im]wsed upon it by a power beyond its control, something
wrought into the constitution of the mind itself, an actual part of it.
I am aware of the statement of the inspired writer: the fool has
said in his heart there is no God, but he was an unmctajihysical fool,
or he would have found in the constitution of his own mind these
intellectual compulsions that demanded the existence of God as a
prerefjuisite to their own validity and truth.
Even those consolations of our own unbeliever in his picture of
the somewhat meagre pleasures of his life, truth and courage, have
no meaning apart from Grod. How simple minded must that man be
who rejoices in the words truth and courage without defining them
or realizing that they have as much life and reality as an Indian
Totem once you take away the belief in God. Such unbelief is the
record of a confused mind that does not make the proper dis-
tinctions intellectually. For if he were to define these terms, truth
and courage, he would see at once that they hark back in the last
THE UXr.RLTKF OF AX U X r.F.I.I KNl-.R 659
analysis to God, the .Vbs(^hite, the Whole. The core of all virtue is
the subordination of the individurd. the part, to the Whole, the .Vh-
solute, which we call God. It is this that makes virtue' virtue, it is
the virtue of all virtues. There is no meaning in virtue or in virtu-
ous actions save as thus interpreted. It is the existence of God,
undefined, impossible of human comprehension intellectually, and
his relation to all created things that constitutes good and e(vil. And
the first and onh- fundamental principle of this relation is the law that
the indi\'idual, the part, must serve the A\'h(ile: in that service lies
the meaning of his existence, the ultimate reason and end of his
life. This service is at once the sacrifice and the salvation of the
individual. To quote an eminent philosopher: "The mere individual
nowhere exists, he is the creature of a theory * ''- * * the individual
self in other words does not -exist."''' \\diat makes courage a virtue,
therefore, is its sacrifice of self to the Whole, the setting aside of
individual safety, pleasure, life, for the sake of the Whole repre-
sented, by a man's countrv. his friend, his family. A man might
sacrifice these for his own selfish gratification by jumping into a
raging torrent ; that would be sillv and meaningless, not the virtue
of courage but the vice of madness. If he did it to save another's
life the act would show true courage, it would be a service of the
Whole at the sacrifice of self. Without God eacJi individual exists
only for himself ; there is no obligation upon him toward any other
man or thing for it is only by the bond which God creates that there
is an}' relation between the individual parts and the ^^dlole. Every
man is his own law and it is a law of perfect absolute selfishness.
Even truth itself disappears, for truth,—assuming that scientific
truth is meant by our undefining unbeliever—exists by reason of the
assumption that the world is governed by law, that there is a fixed
relation of all things to all things, which of course implies God as
the Almighty power that prescribes that law. ( )ur knowdedge can
never compass God : that exceeds our intellectual capacity. We
cannot even imagine wdiat that great mysterious ])ower is that en-
compasses the Universe and that we call God, but we must think him
in some shape if we think law into the a])parent chaos of the world of
phenomena.
Like the man who talked ])rose all his life without knowing it,
our imbelieving friend has been talking in terms of God when he
•Pringle Patterson, The Idea of Cod, pp. 258-9.
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talked of truth and courage, as I have been trying—very imperfectly
I fear—to show.
Far be it from me to decry a wise skepticism, an intelligent un-
belief that asks for proofs before yielding faith, such a skepticism is
a great tool of human progress. It is the skepticism of Huxley who
gave us the useful word Agnostic, of Bacon who made the dis-
tinguished but disturbing suggestion that possibly the uniformity
of Nature was simply an imposition of the human mind on chaotic
phenomena without any sufficient warrant. But a sweeping indis-
criminating skepticism, a blind unbelief of all things is neither help-
ful nor justifiable of reason. Such a skepticism is well characterized
by Mr. George H. Bonner in the 19th Century for January, 1927.
"Atheism, Agnosticism and skepticism are not as sometimes imagined
signs of intellectual maturity, but of intellectual adolescence. Spirit-
ual realities are more real and, therefore, more certain than any par-
ticular thing or isolated fact. Our doubts * * * * have arisen not
liecause our intellectual attainments are superior to those of the
ancients but Ijecause we have not yet reached their level."
Such a skepticism leaves but a ])leak world for the man who says
to himself there is no God, when I die I shall die like a dog, the sub-
lime message of the old prophets for me have no meaning, all that
remains for me is to live and die like the animal I conceive myself
to be; there is nothing for me but like the fool of the Scriptures,
eat, flrink, and l»e merry for to-morrow I die. ^ly life is a little
liigher than the pig, an endless repetition of eating and drinking,
the gratification of animal appetite until by reason of age they lose
their zest and come to the blank nothing of extinction in all the hope-
lessness of age and decrepitude, \\nien God disappears all the
beauty and significance of life disappears with Him. It leaves a
Vv'orld bleak and drear as when at the going down of the sun all the
l)riglUness and color of the world fades away to sombre darkness.
-Vrt and all the higher jo>'s of life take their significance from God.
What is left of (^ireek tragedy, of the Iliad, of the Aeneid, of any of
the great \\-orks of art, ancient or modern, if the sense of some
mighty o\er-ruling power is tpken away, if the world is only a huge
go-as-you-please, a come-by-chance without rhyme or reason, with
no law, no spiritual values established by a supreme law giver ?
In s]iite of ourselves, fight as we may against them, spiritual
truths, ideas of God, of immortalit}-, permeate every moment of our
lives, color our acts often without our conscious knowledge, spring-
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ing upon us when we least expect from some hidden difficulty or
trouble.
" * * how can we guard our unbelief, make it bear fruit to us?
—
the problem here.
Just when we are safest, there's a sunset touch,
A fancy from a flower bell, some one's death,
A chorus ending from Euripides.
—
And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears
As old and new at once as Nature's self."
Browning's Bishop Bloiic/ratii's Apology.
